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Abstract 
Employing an environmentally-differentiated products model with heterogeneous consumers 
in terms of environmental consciousness, this paper examines the effect of a unilateral 
change in a home emission standard on the qualities of products, aggregate emissions, and 
welfare of both home and foreign countries. When firms compete with each other in a 
Cournot fashion, as the home emission standard becomes stricter, aggregate emissions of 
both domestic and foreign countries decrease, if a firm which produces a “dirtier product”’ 
supplies the same product to both domestic and foreign markets. On the other hand, if the 
firm supplies different products in environmental features to different markets, a stricter 
emission standard by the home government increases aggregate emissions of the foreign 
country. Even in the Bertrand duopoly case, the effects of a stricter emission standard on 
both countries could be different from each other.  
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1. Introduction 
People become more environmentally conscious as their country develops and per capita 
income increases. Accordingly, there exist growing concerns about emissions and health 
problems arising from the consumption of products. Governments usually respond to this 
situation by adopting various kinds of standards on emissions and other types of 
consumption-related environmental and health problems. For example, many countries have 
emission standards on motor vehicle exhaust: some are very strict, whereas others are 
relatively lax.1 Moreover, many countries have strict standards on food safety, such as on 
food additives and the residuals of agrochemicals, although international standards exist.2 
Faced with these standards, firms improve the quality of their products, particularly in 
their environmental and health aspects. In the case of motor vehicles, some automakers have 
improved fuel efficiency drastically, whereas others have developed hybrid or electric 
vehicles. Because the strictness of standards varies from one country to another, firms that 
supply their products to more than one country must comply with various types of 
regulations. In some cases, they make products that differ in terms of environmental quality 
according to the number of markets they enter. In other cases, they supply the same type of 
product to more than one market, because it is costly to supply more than one type of 
product.3 
Observing the behavior of these firms regarding the number of types of products they 
supply, it is natural to consider that a change in an emission standard in one country 
                                                 
1  For example, see the following website for the EU standards: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/air_pollution/index_en.htm. For the United 
States, see http://www.epa.gov/otaq/standards/ (Environmental Protection Agency). The Republic of 
Korea has determined that it will adopt standards similar to those of the EU. 
2 For example, see http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/foodsafety/index.html (Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare) for the case of Japan. The international standard is called the CODEX standard. 
See http://www.codexalimentarius.net/ for details. 
3 For example, it may be difficult for one automaker to supply both hybrid and electric vehicles at 
the same time, because it has to invest in R&D, plants, supply chains, and recycling systems. 
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influences other countries’ markets, and that the effect on the domestic market may differ 
from that on the foreign market. 
Focusing on the emissions from consumption, this paper investigates the effect of a 
unilateral change in an emission standard in one country on the product quality, aggregate 
emissions, and welfare of both the domestic and the foreign countries. 
During the past few decades, a considerable number of studies have examined the effect 
of environmental policies in an open economy, when pollution is emitted in the production 
process (see Conrad (1993), Kennedy (1994), Ulph (1996, 1999), Rauscher (1997), and 
Neary (2006), among others). However, relatively few studies have examined environmental 
policies and international trade when pollution is emitted in the consumption process, in 
particular, when consumers are heterogeneous. Motta and Thisse (1999) examine the effect 
of a minimum environmental-quality standard on firms’ behavior and international trade 
strategies. However, in comparing welfare in different situations, they do not take into 
consideration environmental damage. Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002) 
investigate the effects of various environmental policies in a model with vertically 
differentiated products. However, they consider only Bertrand competition. Moreover, 
neither study considers the number of types of products chosen by firms. 
Based on Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002), we employ a differentiated 
products model with heterogeneous consumers in terms of environmental consciousness. 
Some consumers prefer an environmentally friendly product to an environmentally 
unfriendly product even if the former is more expensive than the latter; others, however, 
prefer the latter to the former. Therefore, when two firms enter the market with these 
consumers, their products are differentiated by environmental features. Toshimitsu (2008a) 
employs this type of model, and analyzes the effect of the setting of emission standards by 
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one country on its own welfare when two foreign firms enter the domestic market.4 By 
contrast, we analyze the effect not only on the domestic market but also on the foreign 
market, and examine whether or not the effects are the same in both countries. Usually, it is 
considered that a unilateral emission standard improves the quality of imported products. 
Even if this effect is beneficial for the domestic environment, this does not necessarily lead 
to a decrease in aggregate emissions from consumption in the foreign market. Thus, it is 
important to clarify what effect a change in a unilateral emission standard has on the 
environment. 
In terms of the purpose of this paper, our model has two important features. First, to 
extract the essence of our focus, we consider the duopoly case in which one firm supplies a 
“dirtier product” and the other supplies a “cleaner product” to both the home and foreign 
markets. Because the emission standard we focus on is the upper limit of emission levels per 
unit of consumption, any change in the level of an emission standard directly influences the 
dirtier product. Moreover, to examine whether or not the results depend on the mode of 
competition, we consider two types of basic duopoly models: Cournot duopoly and Bertrand 
duopoly. 
Second, the firm that produces dirtier products may produce more than one type of dirtier 
product in terms of environmental characteristics. This means that, when the firm supplies its 
products to two countries (home and foreign), (a) the firm produces two types of dirtier 
products, (b) each type of product is supplied to either the home or the foreign market, and 
(c) only one type is supplied to each market. 
When the focus is on emissions in the production process, firms’ location choices are 
crucial in understanding the effect of environmental policies. For example, Markusen et al. 
                                                 
4 Toshimitsu (2008b) also applies this model to investigate the effect of a tariff on the domestic 
environment and welfare. 
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(1993) examines the effect of environmental policies on the aggregate emissions when plant 
locations are endogenously determined.5 By contrast, because we focus on emissions in the 
consumption stage, the number and quality of products supplied are crucial. 
The main results are as follows. Suppose that firms compete with each other in a Cournot 
fashion in both home and foreign markets. Then, as an emission standard set by the home 
country becomes stricter, aggregate emissions of both home and foreign countries decrease if 
the firm that produces a ‘dirtier product’ supplies the same product to both markets. However, 
if the firm supplies different types of dirtier products to each market, as the home emission 
standard becomes stricter, the aggregate emissions of the foreign country increase. Even in 
the Bertrand duopoly case, a stricter home emission standard could have different effects on 
the two countries. Moreover, we refer to endogenous determination of the number of types 
of products produced by the firm that produces dirtier products. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 describes 
the equilibria in the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly cases. Section 4 examines the effect of a 
stricter emission standard on product quality, aggregate emissions, and the welfare of both 
countries. Section 5 investigates endogenous determination of the number of types of dirtier 
products. Sections 6 and 7 provide further discussion and concluding remarks, respectively. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 Markets 
We consider a vertically differentiated product model, in which ‘vertically differentiated’ 
implies ‘environmentally differentiated’. There are two countries: the home country, which is 
denoted by h , and the foreign country, which is denoted by f . In each country, there exists 
                                                 
5 Many other analyses have been made on this issue. See Markusen (1997) and Ulph and Valentini 
(1997), among others. 
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a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who differ in their marginal valuations,  , of the 
green features of a product. To simplify, we assume that the distribution of consumers is 
identical in both countries, and that the consumer-matching value is uniformly distributed in 
the market in each country,  1,0 . A consumer for whom   is close to unity (resp. zero) 
is conscious (resp. not conscious) of the environment. Let e  denote the observable level of 
polluting emissions associated with the unit consumption of a product. Each consumer 
purchases either one or no units of the product. The net surplus of consumer   in country 
i  who acquires the variant e  at price ip  is  0,max ipevu   ,   ,0e , where v  
is the utility obtained from consuming a single unit of the product irrespective of the 
variant’s unit emission level. A consumer who does not buy any product is assumed to have a 
net surplus of zero. 
There are two firms outside these two consuming countries, which supply 
environmentally differentiated products to both countries h  and f  (see Figure 1). 6 
Without loss of generality, we assume that firm D  (resp. C ) supplies a product with a unit 
emission level iDe ,  (resp. iCe , ) at price iDp ,  (resp. iCp , ) to the market of country 
i ( fhi , ), and that iCiD ee ,,  . Thus, two types of products are supplied to each country. In 
the following, we call the product produced by firm D  the dirtier product, and the product 
produced by firm C  the cleaner product. 
We derive the demand functions for those differentiated products in country i . The 
index of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the net surplus given by 
purchasing the dirtier and the cleaner products is characterized by 
   iCiDiDiCi eepp ,,,,~  . However, the index of the marginal consumer who is 
                                                 
6 The reason assume the two firms are located outside these two consuming countries is that we 
focus on pollution emissions from consumption and, accordingly, the conflict between the 
consumer’s surplus and environmental damage. We investigate producer’s surplus in Section 6. 
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indifferent between the net surplus given by purchasing the cleaner product and nothing is 
  iCiCi epv ,,ˆ  . Thus, consumer   falling into  ~0   (resp.  ˆ~  ) 
purchases a dirtier (resp. cleaner) product, and consumer   falling into 1ˆ    
purchases nothing.7 Throughout the paper, it is assumed that neither country’s market is 
completely covered by all consumers. 
Let iDq ,  (resp. iCq , ) represent the quantity demanded of the dirtier (resp. the cleaner) 
product in country i . Because a uniform distribution is assumed, the demand functions are 
given by: 
iCiD
iDiC
iiD ee
pp
q
,,
,,
,
~

  , (1.1) 
   
 iCiDiC
iDiCiCiD
iiiC eee
pvepve
q
,,,
,,,,
,
~ˆ

  . (1.2) 
Given (1.1) and (1.2), the corresponding inverse demand functions are given by: 
iCiCiDiDiD qeqevp ,,,,,  , (2.1) 
 iCiDiCiC qqevp ,,,,  . (2.2) 
 
2.2 Firms 
Before price or quantity competition in the markets, the firms need to invest in product lines, 
a supply network, and recycling systems with the associated environmental quality of the 
products. Following Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002, Assumption 2), we 
assume that the cost function of a unit emission level for each firm can be expressed by a 
homogeneous function of degree 1 : 
    DDD eeF , (3.1) 
                                                 
7 It can also be considered that consumer   falling into 1ˆ    purchases the outside good. 
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   CCC eeF . (3.2) 
Note that 0jF , 0jF , DCj , . To avoid multiple equilibria in the decision game of 
the unit emission levels, we assume that cost functions are sufficiently asymmetric among 
the firms: 1 . This implies that firm C  (resp. D ) has an efficient (resp. inefficient) 
environmental technology. For simplicity, we assume that marginal costs of production are 
independent of the unit emission levels and are equal to zero. 
Firm D  can choose different unit emission levels for different markets, i.e., fDhD ee ,,  . 
In such a case, however, it has to pay an additional fixed cost for the production of another 
dirtier product, such as another product line, and an additional recycling network.8 In the 
main analysis in Section 4, the number of types of products produced by firm D  is 
exogenous, whereas in Section 5 we investigate the case in which the number of types of 
products produced by firm D  is endogenously determined. In the following, the statements 
“firm D  produces two types of products” and “firm D  supplies different types of 
products to each market” mean that (a) firm D  produces two types of dirtier products, (b) 
each type is supplied to either the home or the foreign market, and (c) only one type is 
supplied to each country/market. 
Because we focus on an emission standard policy for a dirtier product, hereafter, we 
mainly assume that firm C  supplies the same type of product to both markets.9 This 
implies that firm C  does not pay an additional fixed cost. Thus, the profit functions of the 
two firms are given by: 
                                                 
8 This fixed cost is not the cost for R&D. Thus, even if the unit emission level of the dirtier product 
for the foreign market is higher than that for the home market, firm D has to pay the additional cost. 
In particular, there are ‘ex post’ costs such as the cost of recycling materials included in the product 
for the foreign market. 
9 In reality, as noted in footnote 3, it is sometimes very costly to supply more than one type of 
cleaner product. We briefly discuss the case in which firm C supplies more than one type of product 
in Section 6. 
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fDhDfDfDhDhDD FFqpqp ,,,,,,   , (4.1) 
CfCfChChCC Fqpqp  ,,,, ,  (4.2) 
where   is a dummy variable; 0  if fDhD ee ,,  , or 1  if fDhD ee ,,  . 
 
2.3 Governments and Social Welfare 
We assume that the home government unilaterally sets an emission standard, which is the 
highest emission per unit of consumption when a product is sold and consumed in the home 
market. Because ChD ee , , the emission standard implies the highest emission per unit of 
consumption of the dirtier product, hDe , . This variable is a parameter in our model. We 
assume that there is no emission standard for the foreign market, or the foreign emission 
standard is not binding even if it exists ( fDfD ee ,,  ). On the contrary, hDe ,  is always 
binding and, accordingly, fDhD ee ,,  . 
The aggregate emissions, which increase environmental damage, are expressed by: 
iCiCiDiDi qeqeE ,,,,    fhi , . (5) 
Then, the aggregate emissions level in the global economy is given by fh
G EEE  . 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there are three types of consumers: those purchasing the 
dirtier product, those purchasing the cleaner product, and those never purchasing any 
products in the market. Thus, the aggregate consumer surplus can be represented as: 
    iCiCCiDiDiDi qpdevqpdevCS h
h
i
,,
ˆ
~
,,
~
0
,  



 .  (6) 
The social net surplus of each country is given by:10 
                                                 
10 We consider the profits of firms in Section 6. As noted in footnote 6, our main focus is on the 
conflict between the consumer’s surplus and environmental damage when considering social 
surplus. 
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iiii ECSW    fhi , ,  (7) 
where  fhii ,0   is the marginal social valuation of environmental damage of country 
i .11 
In what follows, we consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, the home government 
changes an emission standard applied to the dirtier product; this change is exogenous in this 
paper. In the second stage, the firms determine the unit emission levels, given the home 
emission standard. In the third stage, they compete in the markets in price or in quantity. We 
derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for each mode of competition by backward 
induction. 
 
3. Equilibria 
3.1 Cournot Duopoly Case 
As the derivation of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the final stage is straightforward, the 
derivation procedure is omitted. The equilibrium quantities in the third stage are given by: 
,
4
1
,
, vee
q
CiD
C
iD    (8.1) 
 veee
ee
q
CiDiC
CiDC
iC 

,,
,
, 4
2
,  (8.2) 
where fhi , . Superscript C  denotes Cournot competition. Hence, the revenue functions 
in the second stage are expressed by: 
    22,
,2
2
,
,
44
v
ee
e
v
ee
e
R
CfD
fD
ChD
hDC
D  , (9.1) 
                                                 
11 Equation (7) implies that each government takes into consideration its own environment only. 
However, this can be easily extended to the case in which emissions cross a national border. 
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 
 
 
  22,
2
,2
2
,
2
,
4
2
4
2
v
eee
ee
v
eee
ee
R
CfDC
CfD
ChDC
ChDC
C 

 . (9.2) 
Because hDe ,  is binding, firm D  supplies the same type of product to both markets, 
fDhD ee ,,  . This implies that firm D  does not solve the profit maximization problem in the 
second stage. However, when firm D  chooses a unit emission level for the foreign market 
different from that for the home market, the first-order condition for profit maximization for 
firm D  in the second stage is obtained as follows: 
  04
4
,
2
3
,
, 
 fD
CfD
CfD Fv
ee
ee
.  (10.1) 
However, firm C  can choose the unit emission level of its own product by itself. From 
(4.2) and (9.2), the first-order condition is: 
  
  hDhDCi CiDC
CCiDiDCiD eefhiFv
eee
eeeeee
,,
2
3
,
2
2
,
2
,, ,,,0
4
282 
 . (10.2) 
It is assumed that the second-order conditions are satisfied. See Appendix 1 for details. 
Based on (10.1) and (10.2), let us define the reaction functions of the unit emission levels in 
the Cournot duopoly case as follows: 
  0,,  CDCCDfD ee  ,  (11.1) 
  0,0,, ,,,,  fDCChDCCfDhDCCC eeeee  . (11.2) 
Figure 2 shows these reaction functions when firm D  chooses a unit emission level for 
the foreign market different from that for the home market. If firm D  supplies the same 
type of dirtier product to both countries, the situation in the foreign market (the figure on the 
right) is the same as that in the home market (the figure on the left). 
In view of (11.1), and (11.2), the unit emission levels of the products are strategic 
substitutes (resp. complements) with respect to firm D  (resp. firm C ) in the Cournot 
duopoly case (see Appendix 1). The intuition is as follows. An increase in the unit emission 
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level of the cleaner (resp. the dirtier) product decreases (resp. increases) the difference in 
products’ environmental quality. As the difference decreases (resp. increases), competition 
among the firms is intensified (resp. mitigated). Thus, the marginal revenue of increasing the 
unit emission level for firm D  (resp. firm C ) decreases (resp. increases). 
Based on (11.1) and (11.2), when firm D  chooses the unit emission level for the 
product supplied to the foreign market, there is a unique and stable Nash equilibrium, i.e., 
 CCC fD ee ,, , given hDe , . See Appendix 2. 
 
3.2 Bertrand Duopoly Case 
Similar to the Cournot duopoly case, the equilibrium quantities for the Bertrand duopoly 
case in the third stage are given by: 
,
4
1
,
, vee
q
CiD
B
iD    (12.1) 
  ,4
2
,
,
. veee
e
q
CiDC
iDB
iC   (12.2) 
where fhi , . Superscript B  denotes Bertrand competition. Hence, the revenue functions 
in the second stage are expressed by: 
    22,
,2
2
,
,
44
v
ee
ee
v
ee
ee
R
CfD
CfD
ChD
ChDB
D 

 , (13.1) 
 
 
 
  22,
,,2
2
,
,,
4
4
4
4
v
eee
eee
v
eee
eee
R
CfDC
CfDfD
ChDC
ChDhDB
C 

 . (13.2) 
When firm D  chooses a unit emission level for the foreign market different from that 
for the home market, the first-order condition for the profit maximization of firm D  in the 
second stage is obtained from (4.1) and (13.1) as follows: 
  04
74
,
2
3
,
, 
 fD
CfD
CfD Fv
ee
ee
.  (14.1) 
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However, from (4.2) and (13.2), the first-order condition for firm C  is given by: 
 
  hDhDCi CiDC
CCiDiDiD eefhiFv
eee
eeeee
,,
2
3
,
2
2
,
2
,, ,,,0
4
2344 
 . (14.2) 
It is assumed that the second-order conditions are satisfied. See Appendix 3 for the details. 
Based on the properties of the revenue functions, let us define the reaction functions of 
the unit emission levels in the Bertrand duopoly case as follows: 
  0,,  BDCBDfD ee  , (15.1) 
  0,0,, ,,,,  fDBChDBCfDhDBCC eeeee  . (15.2) 
Figure 3 shows these reaction functions when firm D  chooses a unit emission level for 
the foreign market different from that for the home market. If firm D  supplies the same 
type of dirtier product to both countries, the situation in the foreign market (the figure on the 
right) is the same as that in the home market (the figure on the left). 
In this case, the unit emission levels of the products are strategic complements for both 
firms (see Appendix 3). In the Bertrand competition, as the difference in environmental 
quality between products increases, price competition between firms is mitigated, and the 
revenue of both firms increases. Therefore, a decrease in the unit emission level of the dirtier 
(resp. cleaner) product gives firm C  (resp. firm D ) an incentive to improve the 
environmental quality of its own product. 
Based on (15.1) and (15.2), when firm D  chooses the unit emission level for the 
product supplied to the foreign market, there is a unique and stable Nash equilibrium, i.e., 
 BCB fD ee ,, , given hDe , . See Appendix 2. 
 
4. Emission Standards, Product Quality, and the Environment 
In this section, we investigate the effect of a change in the emission standard set by the home 
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government on the environmental quality of products supplied to the two markets, aggregate 
emissions, and net social surpluses of both countries. 
 
4.1 Cournot Duopoly Case 
First, we consider the effect on the unit emission levels of products. When firm D  supplies 
the same type of product to both markets, which means that the unit emission level for both 
markets is hDe , , firm D  does not solve the profit maximization problem, whereas firm C  
does. For this case, we obtain the following conditions. 
 
Lemma 1: 10
,

hD
C
C
ed
de
 and 10 ,
,
 C
C
hD
hD
C
C
e
e
ed
de  hold. 
 
See Appendix 4 for the proof. Lemma 1 implies that a stricter home emission standard 
decreases the unit emission levels of both the dirtier and the cleaner products. Moreover, the 
decrease in the unit emission level of the cleaner product is smaller than that of the dirtier 
product. 
However, when firm D  produces a product with a unit emission level for the foreign 
market different from that for the home market, the following conditions are obtained.12 
 
Lemma 2: ,10
,

hD
C
C
ed
de
 10 ,
,
 C
C
hD
hD
C
C
e
e
ed
de , and 0
,
, 
hD
C
fD
ed
de
 hold. 
 
See Appendix 5 for the proof. Lemma 2 implies that when the home government makes its 
                                                 
12 We do not explicitly analyze the case in which firm D  produces a product with a different 
emission level for the foreign market, and fDe ,  is binding. This case can be analyzed in a similar 
way, and the results are essentially the same. 
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emission standard stricter, (a) the unit emission level of the cleaner product decreases, and 
(b) the unit emission level of the dirtier product supplied to the foreign market increases. The 
direct effect of this situation is shown in Figure 4. 
It should be noted that when firm D  supplies the same type of product to both markets, 
the effects of a stricter home emission standard are the same for both markets. However, 
when firm D  supplies different types of products to each market, the effects of a stricter 
emission standard are different for the home and the foreign markets. 
Now let us investigate the aggregate emissions. Substituting (8.1) and (8.2) into (5), the 
aggregate emissions level in country i  is written as: 
v
ee
ee
E
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and the effects of changes in the unit emission levels on the aggregate emissions are given 
by: 
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An increase in the unit emission level of the dirtier product increases the supply of the 
cleaner product. These effects dominate the effect of a decrease in the supply of the dirtier 
product. However, an increase in the unit emission level of the cleaner product (a) decreases 
the supply of the cleaner product, (b) decreases the unit emission level of the dirtier product, 
and (c) increases the supply of the dirtier product. In total, the aggregate emissions decrease. 
From (17) and Lemma 1, when firm D  supplies the same type of product to both 
markets, the effects of a stricter emission standard on the aggregate emissions are obtained: 
.,,0
,
fhi
ed
dE
hD
C
i   (18) 
However, from (17) and Lemma 2, when firm D  supplies different types of products to 
each market, the effects are given by: 
 16
0
,

hD
C
h
ed
dE
,  0
,

hD
C
f
ed
dE
. (19) 
Consequently, the following proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the firms compete with each other in a Cournot fashion. As the 
home emission standard becomes stricter, the home aggregate emissions decrease. However, 
the effect on the foreign aggregate emissions depends on whether or not firm D  supplies 
different types of products to each market: (a) when firm D  supplies the same type of 
product to both markets, the foreign aggregate emissions also decrease, (b) when firm D  
supplies different types of products to each market ( fDhD ee ,,  ), the foreign aggregate 
emissions increase. 
 
Now, we can derive the effects on the social net surplus. From the definition of the 
consumer surplus, it is easily verified that: 
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 (20) 
Therefore, from Lemma 1, it is clear that ),(0, fhieddCS hD
C
i   holds when firm D  
supplies the same product to both markets. Even if firm D  supplies different types of 
products to each market, ),(0, fhieddCS hD
C
i   holds, because the effect of a change in 
Ce  dominates that of a change in fDe , . Therefore, when the social net surplus is defined as 
(7), from (18) and (19), the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that the firms compete with each other in a Cournot fashion. As the 
home emission standard becomes stricter, the home social net surplus increases, which is 
defined as the consumer surplus minus environmental damage. As far as firm D  supplies 
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the same type of product to both markets, the foreign social net surplus also increases. 
However, when firm D  supplies different types of products to each market, the foreign 
social net surplus decreases if the marginal valuation of environmental damage ( f ) is 
greater than a certain level, that is    hDBfhDBff eddEeddCS ,, . 
 
It is interesting to consider the comparison between the emission standard to maximize 
the home social net surplus and the world optimum, although the comparison is not our main 
purpose. For example, as noted in Proposition 2, when firm D  supplies different types of 
products to each market, a stricter home emission standard may reduce the foreign social net 
surplus. In such a case, the standard when the home social net surplus is maximized is 
stricter than the world optimum. 
 
4.2 Bertrand Duopoly Case 
First, we consider the effect on the unit emission levels of products. When firm D  supplies 
the same type of product to both markets, we obtain the following conditions. 
 
Lemma 3: 10
,

hD
B
C
ed
de  and 10 ,
,
 B
C
hD
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B
C
e
e
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de  hold. 
 
See Appendix 4 for the proof. This result is the same as in the Cournot case. 
However, when firm D  chooses a unit emission level for the foreign market different 
from that for the home market, we obtain the following conditions. 
 
Lemma 4: ,10
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See Appendix 5 for the proof. Lemma 4 implies that when the home government makes its 
emission standard stricter, (a) the unit emission level of the cleaner product decreases, and 
(b) the unit emission level of the dirtier product supplied to the foreign market also decreases. 
The direct effect of this situation is shown in Figure 5. 
Now let us investigate the aggregate emissions. Substituting (12.1) and (12.2) into (5), 
the aggregate emissions level in country i  is written as: 
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and the effects of changes in the unit emission levels on the aggregate emissions are given 
by: 
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Note that the directions of changes in the aggregate emissions are opposite to those in the 
Cournot duopoly case. Intuitively, whether or not price competition becomes more serious is 
an important factor. Serious competition increases the supply of both products and, 
accordingly, the aggregate emissions. 
From (22) and Lemma 3, when firm D  supplies the same type of product to both 
markets, the effects of a strict emission standard on the aggregate emissions are obtained: 
.,,0
,
fhi
ed
dE
hD
B
i   (23) 
However, from (22) and Lemma 4, when firm D  supplies different types of products to 
each market, the effects are given by: 
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Consequently, the following proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that the firms compete with each other in a Bertrand fashion. As the 
home emission standard becomes stricter, the home aggregate emissions increase. However, 
the effect on the foreign aggregate emissions depends on whether or not firm D  supplies 
different types of products to each market: (a) when firm D  supplies the same type of 
product to both markets, the foreign aggregate emissions also increase, (b) when firm D  
supplies different types of products to each market, the foreign aggregate emissions 
decrease. 
 
Regarding the effect on the home market, Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002, 
Proposition 5) obtained this result. The home aggregate emissions increase as the home 
emission standard becomes stricter. This is because the number of consumers who buy either 
of two types of products increases. Then, from the environmental point of view, the home 
government should not set any emission standard in this case. 
From the definition of consumer surplus, it is easily verified that: 
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 (25) 
Therefore, it is clear from Lemma 3 that ),(0, fhieddCS hD
B
i   holds when firm D  
supplies the same product to both markets. Even if firm D  produces two types of products, 
),(0, fhieddCS hD
B
i   holds from Lemma 4. Thus, when the social net surplus is 
defined as (7), from (23) and (24), the following proposition holds. 
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Proposition 4: Suppose that the firms compete with each other in a Bertrand fashion. When 
firm D  supplies different types of products to each market, as the home emission standard 
becomes stricter, the foreign social net surplus increases. However, if the marginal valuation 
of environmental damage is smaller than a certain level, that is 
   hDChhDChh eddEeddCS ,, , a stricter home emission standard increases the home social 
net surplus, which does not depend on whether firm D  produces one or two types of dirtier 
products. 
 
Two points should be noted. First, similar to the Cournot duopoly case, the comparison of 
the optimal emission standard for the home government with the world optimum is 
interesting. For example, when firm D  chooses a different unit emission level for the 
foreign market from that for the home market, it is clear from Proposition 4 that the 
unilateral emission standard is likely to be laxer than the world optimum. 
Second, although the directions of changes are different between the Cournot and 
Bertrand cases, the following fact holds for both cases: when firm D  produces two types of 
dirtier products, the effects of a stricter home emission standard on the aggregate emissions 
of both countries are different from each other. 
 
5. Endogenous Determination of the Number of Types of Dirtier Products 
In the previous section, the number of types of products of firm D  is assumed to be 
exogenous. It is, however, important to consider the case in which firm D  decides to 
produce two types of dirtier products. In this section, we focus on the difference in the social 
valuation of environmental damages, which is considered to be reflected in the emission 
standards. 
If there are no emission standards in either country, firm D  supplies the same type of 
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product to both markets, because it has to pay an additional fixed cost to produce two types 
of products. If, however, the emission standard in one country is much stricter than that in 
the other country, firm D  may have an incentive to supply different types of products to 
each market. In other words, firm D  makes each type of product fit to each emission 
standard. Even if it has to pay an additional cost, the profit may be greater when it produces 
two types of dirtier products than when it supplies the same type of product to both markets 
because of less serious competition. Similar to the previous section, we assume that the 
foreign emission standard is not binding, whereas the home emission standard is binding. 
This implies that if firm D  produces two types of products, the unit emission level of the 
product for the foreign market is higher than that for the home market ( fDhD ee ,,  ). Thus, 
we investigate whether or not a stricter emission standard changes firm D ’s decision 
regarding the number of types of products. 
Let us begin with the case of Cournot duopoly. In this case, from (9.1), we obtain that 
0,  fDCD eR . Because firm C  supplies the same type of product to both markets, firm 
D  has no incentive to pay an additional cost to produce another type of product. This fact 
immediately leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: Suppose that firms compete with each other in a Cournot fashion. Then, firm 
D  supplies the same type of products to both markets irrespective of the strictness of the 
home emission standard. 
 
This result is simple, but important. In the previous section, we demonstrated that 
whether or not firm D  supplies the same type of product to both markets crucially affects 
the effect of a home emission standard on the aggregate emissions and the social surplus of 
the foreign country. Proposition 5 states that, if the number of types of products firm D  
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supplies is endogenously determined, and if the mode of competition is Cournot competition, 
the effect of a change in the home emission standard on the home country is the same as that 
on the foreign country. 
Let us now turn to the case of Bertrand duopoly. When there is no home emission 
standard, 0,  fDBD eR  holds. Even if there is a home emission standard, if it is not very 
strict, 0,  fDBD eR  also holds (see Appendix 3). In this case, the same result as the case 
of the Cournot duopoly holds (Proposition 5). However, the stricter the home emission 
standard, the more likely it is that 0,  fDBD eR  holds as long as firm D  supplies the 
same type of product to both markets. 
Let us focus on firm D ’s incentive to deviate from the situation in which hDfD ee ,,  . 
Consider the case in which 0,  fDBD eR  holds, and let fDe ,  denote a unit emission level 
that is greater than hDe , . 
When hDfD ee ,,  , from (13.1): 
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Because 10 ,  hDBC edde , 0DF , and 0DF , the smaller the difference between 
the unit emission levels of the two firms’ products, the more likely it is that 0, hDBD edd  
holds. This means that the stricter the home emission standard, the more likely it is that a 
small decrease in hDe ,  decreases the profit of firm D . 
However, because 0 CBD eR  and 10 ,  hDC edde , the profit of firm D  
increases when setting the unit emission level for the foreign market equal to fDe , , as the 
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home emission standard becomes stricter. It holds for any level of fDe , . Thus, the following 
proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 6: Suppose that firms compete with each other in a Bertrand fashion. Then, the 
stricter the home emission standard, the stronger is firm D ’s incentive to deviate from the 
situation in which it supplies the same type of products to both markets. 
 
This result for the Bertrand case is in sharp contrast to that for the Cournot case. 
According to Proposition 6, when the environmental consciousness of the home country is 
much greater than that of the foreign country, it is likely that the unit emission level 
regulated by the home emission standard is lower than that of the dirtier product for the 
foreign market. Thus, the effect of a change in the home emission standard on the home 
aggregate emissions is likely to be different from that on the foreign aggregate emissions. 
 
6. Further Discussion 
6.1 Producer’s Surplus and Domestic Firms 
Although we have assumed to this point that firms are located outside the two consuming 
countries, it is possible that they are located in these countries. Therefore, the profits of firms 
are worth examining. 
First, let us examine the profit of firm C . Whether or not firm D  supplies the same 
type of product to both markets, firm C  chooses the unit emission level of its own product 
to maximize its own profit given the unit emission levels of the products of firm D . 
Therefore, the effect of a change in the home emission standard on the profit is represented 
as: 
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It is clear that the stricter the home emission standard, the smaller is the profit of firm C , 
when firm D  supplies the same type of product. Moreover, from Lemma 4, if firms 
compete with each other in a Bertrand fashion, even when firms supply different types of 
products to each market, the profit of firm C  decreases as the home emission standard 
becomes stricter. In this case, from (20) and (25), the effect of a stricter home emission 
standard on the consumer’s surplus conflicts with that on the profit of firm C . 
Second, let us examine the profit of firm D . From (26), we know that the effect of a 
change in the home emission standard on the profit is ambiguous. However, when the effect 
is evaluated at the unit emission level when there is no emission standard ( jDe 0, ), we have 
that: 
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Recall that 0 CjD eR  holds when firms compete with each other in a Bertrand 
fashion. In this case, both the consumer’s surplus and the profit of firm D  increase when 
the home emission standard becomes marginally stricter from jDe 0, . This implies that 
Proposition 4 may hold for a country in which firm D  is located, even if firms’ profits are 
taken into consideration. 
 
6.2 Firm C ’s Choice regarding the Number of Types of Cleaner Products 
To this point, assuming that firm C  supplies the same type of product to both markets, we 
have focused mainly on the types of dirtier products of firm D . This is, however, easily 
extended to the case in which firm C supplies different types of products to each market. 
First, consider the case in which both firms determine one unit emission level for each 
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market. When the home government makes its emission standard stricter, each firm changes 
the unit emission level of its own product for the home market. However, neither firm 
changes the unit emission levels of products supplied to the foreign market. This is because 
the unit emission level of the dirtier product supplied to the foreign market is not influenced 
by a change in the home emission standard. 
Second, consider the case in which firm C  determines one unit emission level for each 
market whereas firm D  supplies only one type of product, which is supplied to both 
markets. In this case, a change in the home emission standard has the same effect on the unit 
emission levels of dirtier products supplied to both markets. Accordingly, the unit emission 
levels of the cleaner products supplied to both markets also change in the same way. This 
result is the same as the case in which each firm supplies only one type of product. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the effect of the home emission standard on the 
foreign market crucially depends on whether or not firm D , whose products are directly 
affected by emission standards, supplies different types of products to each market. 
 
6.3 Unilateral Home Emission Standards and Foreign Environmental Damage 
Finally, taking into consideration the endogenous determination of the number of types of 
dirtier products, we consider whether a unilateral change in the home emission standard 
increases the aggregate emissions in the foreign market. 
According to Proposition 5, firm D  never has an incentive to produce more than one 
type of dirtier product when firms compete in a Cournot fashion. Moreover, according to 
Proposition 1, only when firm D  supplies different types of products to each market do the 
foreign aggregate emissions increase as the home emission standard becomes stricter. 
Consequently, in the case of Cournot duopoly, a stricter home emission standard never 
increases the foreign aggregate emissions. 
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In the case of Bertrand duopoly, when firm D  supplies different types of products to 
each market, the foreign aggregate emissions decrease as the home emission standard 
becomes stricter. However, according to Proposition 3 (Moraga-González and 
Padrón-Fumero (2002), Proposition 5), when firm D  supplies the same type of product to 
both markets, a stricter home emission standard increases both the home and the foreign 
aggregate emissions. Thus, the following case never takes place: a stricter home emission 
standard decreases the home aggregate emissions and increases the foreign aggregate 
emissions. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the stricter home emission standard is not a kind of 
“beggar thy neighbor” policy, as far as both firms supply their products to both markets, that 
is, they are global firms. 
However, there is a situation in which a stricter home emission standard decreases (resp. 
increases) the home (resp. foreign) aggregate emissions. Consider the case in which firm C  
is a global firm, whereas firm D  is a domestic firm. This means that there is one firm that 
produces a dirtier product in each country, and firm D  in the home (resp. foreign) country 
supplies its own product only to the home (resp. foreign) market. In this case, each firm 
D determines the unit emission level for its own product. Therefore, if firms compete in a 
Cournot fashion, the foreign aggregate emissions increase as the home emission standard 
becomes stricter.13 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We have examined the effect of a unilateral change in an emission standard on the product 
quality, aggregate emissions, and welfare of both domestic and foreign countries. To this end, 
                                                 
13 The producer’s surplus should be taken into consideration when considering the social net surplus. 
Thus, the effect of a stricter home emission standard is more complicated in this case than in the 
case in Section 4. 
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we employed a differentiated products model with heterogeneous consumers in terms of 
environmental consciousness. Moreover, we considered both Cournot and Bertrand duopoly 
cases. 
The results we obtained are very clear: whether or not the effects of a stricter home 
emission standard on both the domestic and the foreign countries are the same depends on 
the types of products produced by the firm that supplies dirtier products (firm D ). In other 
words, when firm D  supplies different products in terms of environmental features to each 
market, the effects on the two countries differ from each other. This means that a unilateral 
change in an emission standard could be either beneficial or harmful to other countries, and 
that the firms’ behavior regarding how many types of products they supply is crucial. 
Moreover, when considering the endogenous determination of the number of types of 
products produced by firm D , the result in the case of Bertrand duopoly is in sharp contrast 
to that of Cournot duopoly. In the former case, the stricter the home emission standard, the 
stronger is firm D ’s incentive to produce two types of dirtier products. However, in the 
latter case, firm D  keeps producing one type of dirtier product, even if the home emission 
standard becomes stricter. 
To highlight the essence of the issue we focused on, some interesting factors were 
excluded from the analysis, although the results obtained in this paper are not influenced by 
those factors. First, the environmental criteria for cleaner products, such as environmental 
labeling, could also be a focus. The effects of a strict awarding rule for a ‘cleaner product’ on 
the domestic and foreign markets could also be different from each other, and may be 
counterintuitive. Second, the strategic behavior of both governments was not taken into 
consideration. It is important to verify whether or not emission standards of countries are 
optimal in terms of world welfare. In this respect, the situation in which a government sets 
its emission standard depending on the emission standards of other countries should be 
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examined. Elucidating these effects is our future task. 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Given (10.1) and (10.2), the first-order properties are given by: 
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Furthermore, the second-order properties are given by: 
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From (A.2), since it holds that the revenue functions are not concave, the cost functions 
should be sufficiently convex to ensure that the second-order conditions hold. (A.3) implies 
that the unit emission levels of the products are strategic substitutes (resp. complements) for 
firm D  (resp. firm C ) in the Cournot duopoly case. 
 
Appendix 2  
The determinant of the matrix can be generally expressed as: 
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Furthermore, from (11.1), (11.2), (15.1) and (15.2), the following equations hold: 
    fD
CfD
k
D
C
fD
k
D
fD Fee
Re
e
Re ,
,
2
2
,
2
, 2 

                                    (A.5.1) 
    C
hDC
k
C
hD
fDC
k
C
fD
C
k
C
C Fee
Re
ee
Re
e
Re 



2
,
2
,
,
2
,2
2
                        (A.5.2) 
 29
Substituting (A.5.1) and (A.5.2) into (A.4), we obtain that 
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where )( CCCC FFe  , and )( ,,,, fDfDfDfD FFe  . From (3.1) and (3.2), both of them 
are equal to  21  . 
   In the Bertrand duopoly case, since all cross partial derivatives are positive (See 
Appendix 3), the sign of the determinant is positive. Thus, the stability condition is satisfied. 
On the other hand, in the Cournot duopoly case, 0,
2  CfDCD eeR . However, if 
02 ,
2  fDD e  and 022  CC e holds, it is clear from (A.4) that the sign of the 
determinant is positive. This fact is also verified from (A.6). If 02 ,
2  fDD e holds, the 
absolute value of the third term in (A.6) is greater than that of the second term. Thus, the 
stability condition is satisfied. 
 
Appendix 3 
Given (14.1) and (14.2), the first-order properties are given by: 
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We assume the existence of an interior solution such that fDC ee ,47   when firm D  
chooses a unit emission level for the foreign market different from that for the home market. 
Furthermore, the second-order properties are given by: 
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From (A.7), since it holds that the revenue functions are not necessarily concave, the cost 
functions should be sufficiently convex to ensure that the second-order conditions hold. 
(A.8) implies that the unit emission levels of the products are strategic complements for both 
firms in the Bertrand duopoly case. 
 
Appendix 4 
In this Appendix, the same results hold for both modes of competition, we abbreviate 
superscripts B  and C . When hDfD ee ,,  , 
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From (A.3), when the second order conditions are satisfied, (A.10) is positive. In this case, 
(A.5.2) can be rewritten as: 
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Thus, 
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Since 2C  and ChD ee , , Lemmas 1 and 3 hold.  
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Appendix 5 
We basically abbreviate superscripts B  and C  in this Appendix. The effect of a change in 
the home emission standard on the unit emission levels are obtained as follows: 
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From (A.3) and (A.9), (A.12.1) is negative (resp. positive) in the Cournot (resp. Bertrand) 
duopoly case. (A.12.2) is positive regardless of the mode of competition. Thus,  
   The numerator of (A.12.2) is   
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If 02 ,
2  fDD e holds, from (A.6), Lemma 2 holds. 
From (A.12.1) and (A.12.2), it holds that 
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In the case of Bertrand competition, if 02 ,
2  fDD e holds, (A.13) is positive. Taking 
(A.5.1) and 2. fD into consideration, Lemma 4 holds. 
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